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Abstract: This article contributes to the international political theory of humanitarianism by 
unpicking the politics of humanitarian action’s simplest expression: saving human lives in 
the name of humanity. Both saving lives and defining notions of common humanity are 
closely interrelated acts of power. What saving a life means depends on a prior definition of 
humanity; humanitarians’ acts of rescue are the measure of their commitment to humanity. 
The politics of rescue and the politics of humanity are inextricably linked. The article 
explores four facets of this nexus. First, it considers the meanings of rescue, from saving 
bodies to saving lives, linked to contingent understandings of humanity. Second, it turns to 
the rescuers, for whom rescue performs particular functions, not least the need to preserve 
a sense of self. Third, it situates their often narcissistic motives in relation to the 
consequences of humanitarian action. Fourth, it addresses the power imbalance inherent in 
rescue and the problem of causing harm. It concludes that rescue is always an act of 
presumption, but one that can be tempered by humanitarian actors willing to embrace their 
role as ‘moral politicians’ (Walzer), aware of their power and their dirty hands, and open to 
contrasting understandings of humanity.   
 
Keywords: International political theory, Humanitarianism, Humanity, Rescue, Altruism, 
Humanitarian Intervention. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Whoever saves one life, it is as if he saved the entire world.
1
  
(Talmudic saying) 
 
Whoever has saved a life, it is as if he has saved the whole of humanity.
2
 
(Qur’anic verse) 
 
To save a life is to save all of humanity.
3
  
(motto of the Syrian White Helmets) 
  
The three almost identical statements above capture a core intuition of humanitarianism, 
despite none of them issuing from ‘typical’ humanitarian actors. Much about the concept of 
humanitarianism is highly contested. But few would disagree that it depends on an idea of 
common humanity, and that at its heart sits a commitment to saving lives. 
Ideas of humanity and rescue, or salvation, are central to the development of 
professionalised, institutionalised humanitarianism.
4
 But not only a professional 
                                                          
1
 Martin Gilbert, The Righteous: The Unsung Heroes of the Holocaust (London: Transworld, 2002), p. xiv. 
2
 Liisa H. Malkki, The Need to Help: The Domestic Arts of International Humanitarianism (Durham, NC.: Duke 
University Press, 2015), p. 231. 
3
 Raed Al Saleh, ‘My Staff Are Trying to Save Lives in the Rubble of Ghouta. Who Will Help Us?’, The Guardian 
(22 February 2018). 
4
 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); 
Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present’, in Michael Barnett 
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humanitarian can carry out a humanitarian act. What is often missing from the International 
Relations, international political theory and humanitarian studies literature is sustained 
consideration of the ethico-political implications of more spontaneous humanitarian acts, 
whether the individual mobilisations and acts of resistance that led to the formation of the 
White Helmets in Syria (among many other grassroots humanitarian actors), or, at an even 
more individualised level, rescues of Jews during the Holocaust by those subsequently 
honoured as the Righteous Among the Nations. I argue that we should recognise their acts 
as humanitarian because they bring together the attempt to save a human life with the 
commitment to a common humanity, not because they are engaged in the neutral, impartial 
and independent provision of relief.
5
 
This article explores the relationship between the two emblematic concepts of 
humanity and rescue, paying particular attention to the practices of power they embody 
and perpetuate, even at the individual scale – for to have the power to save is to have the 
power of life or death. As one of humanitarianism’s most constructive critics, Liisa Malkki, 
has noted, “every power implies a kind of politics”.
6
 Humanitarianism can thus usefully be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (London: Cornell University 
Press, 2008). 
5
 Three of the four ‘classic’ humanitarian principles, alongside humanity. Interestingly, where spontaneous 
humanitarianism becomes institutionalised, as with the White Helmets or Syria Civil Defence, to use their 
official name, they often draw on that classic package of humanitarian principles, as evidenced by Syria Civil 
Defence’s Charter of Principles. The point of this article is not to jettison the core humanitarian principles 
entirely, but rather to suggest that there is a prior level of analysis, in terms of understanding the ethico-
political contours of humanitarianism, that is rarely explored. Syria Civil Defence, ‘Charter of Principles’,  
http://syriacivildefense.org/sites/default/files/COP.pdf. 
6
 Malkki, The Need to Help, p. 205. 
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understood as a politics of humanity. The article addresses the intersection between the 
politics of humanity and the politics of rescue, arguing that this nexus represents the 
beating heart of humanitarian politics.
7
 In mapping out this intersection, the article makes 
an original contribution to the international political theory of humanitarianism, enriches 
our understanding of the ethico-political contours of humanitarian action, and fills a gap in 
fully exploring the meaning of rescue, rather than assuming its meaning to rescuer or 
rescued. 
But the article also addresses a gap in International Relations more broadly, making 
the case that studying rescue allows us better to grasp some of the tensions that have 
bedevilled the practice and implementation of military humanitarian intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect, as well as the more conventional humanitarian practices evoked 
above. 
The idea of rescue is at the heart of the nexus between humanitarianism and 
International Relations, which as a discipline tends to privilege the study of military 
humanitarian intervention, usually problematised in terms of the breach, or reconfiguration 
of sovereignty it entails, or the clash between ‘order’ and ‘justice’, rather than what rescue 
                                                          
7
 In her major study of the political ethics of humanitarian INGOs, Jennifer Rubenstein argues plausibly that the 
social role of rescuer is both normatively problematic and too narrow to describe the actions of such agencies. 
However, my aim here is to focus on concepts, roles and practices that are constitutive of the very idea of 
humanitarianism, not present an exhaustive account of the varied social roles humanitarians, and 
humanitarian agencies, embody. Jennifer C. Rubenstein, Between Samaritans and States: The Political Ethics of 
Humanitarian INGOs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 29-33. It is also important to note the title of 
one of the foundational texts of the international political theory of humanitarian intervention, by Michael 
Walzer. It does not, however, really engage with the actual relationship of rescue – focusing instead on the 
decision to intervene or not. Michael Walzer, ‘The Politics of Rescue’, Social Research 62:1 (1995). 
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actually means.
8
 This leads to language often evocative of a cavalry “coming to the rescue” 
(a common phrase in the IR literature) embedded in imaginaries or fantasies of rescue.
9
 
Even the most nuanced account of the topic within mainstream IR, Nick Wheeler’s Saving 
Strangers, arguably contains an intermingling of rescue and emergency imaginaries in 
setting up the issues: “A supreme humanitarian emergency exists when the only hope of 
saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the rescue.”
10
 Focusing in on the content of 
rescue, as carried out in the name of common humanity, opens up a set of tensions and 
questions that can help to explain the very mixed recent record of state-led rescue. 
                                                          
8
 A much-cited quote from IR’s urtext on military humanitarian intervention is: “humanitarian intervention 
exposes the conflict between order and justice at its starkest” (italics in original). Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 11. 
9
 For instance: “R2P breaks new ground in coming to the rescue.” Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Business 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 152.  The phrase “rescue fantasies” comes, significantly in the light of Edward 
Luck’s former role as Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, from 
Edward C. Luck and Dana Zaret Luck, ‘The Individual Responsibility to Protect’, in Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, 
and Alex Zucker (ed.), Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 
215. Cited in Morgan Brigg, ‘Humanitarian Symbolic Exchange: Extending Responsibility to Protect through 
Individual and Local Engagement’, Third World Quarterly 39:5 (2018), p. 844. The idea, building on Charles 
Taylor’s work on social imaginaries, of emergency imaginaries within humanitarian action, is outlined in Craig 
Calhoun, ‘The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian 
Action’, in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2008); ‘The Idea of Emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order’ 
in Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi (eds.), Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and 
Humanitarian Interventions (New York: Zone Books, 2010). 
10
 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 34. 
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Throughout, I juxtapose the experiences of ‘spontaneous humanitarians’, 
professional humanitarians, and other actors, such as state actors engaged in military 
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, one of the aims of the article is to consider the question 
of rescue across all three types of actors, since, for instance, collective memories of the acts 
of the Righteous Among the Nations are hardly incidental to contemporary calls for 
powerful states to intervene to save distant strangers subject to mass atrocities; 
professional humanitarians’ experience of what can go wrong in negotiating others’ 
humanity for them under the banner of rescue can tell also us much about the potential for 
military humanitarian intervention to cause harm beyond the level of ‘collateral damage’. In 
particular, I think it is helpful, especially when thinking about the act of rescue itself within 
humanitarianism, to take spontaneous acts of rescue as our touchstone. They allow us to 
reason from a concrete, visceral act that is recognisably humanitarian, without having to pin 
down ex ante the boundaries of what humanitarianism is, and thus what humanitarian 
rescue might look like. But it is also important to note that the leap from the spontaneous to 
the institutionalised, from the individual to the collective, magnifies substantially the 
problems of power disparity that are intrinsic to the rescuer-rescued relationship.  
Section II. considers what is being rescued, whether human bodies or human lives, 
tangible or intangible humanity, and finds that humanitarians must engage with both 
dimensions. In either case their engagement is shaped by power relations, whether in 
deciding how best to save a human body, or in defining an underlying conception of 
common humanity that may not fully be shared by the ‘rescued’ party. 
As such, Section III. argues that we need to consider the role of the rescuer more 
thoroughly, and the functions that rescue fulfils for those engaging in it. It highlights the 
prevalence of salvationist tendencies and the desire to find a saving idea. Rescue 
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imaginaries are a key part of the humanitarian imaginaries that frame humanitarian actions 
and reinforce the power relations identified in the first section. At the same time, if we are 
not to reify an impossibly demanding altruism, it seems valuable for humanitarian acts of 
rescue to be embedded in actors’ self-understanding and, indeed, self-interest. 
How then ethically to assess the motivations of putative acts of rescue, when they 
might just be, if not humanitarian alibis for misconduct, then the self-flattering delusions of 
the powerful? This is core terrain for international political theory: how to weigh 
humanitarian motivations or intentions against real-world consequences? Section IV. tackles 
this problem. It concludes that consequences matter, but that we cannot disregard the 
sources of humanitarian solidarity either: commitments to common humanity embedded 
within actors’ complex identities. It is the negotiation amongst all these factors, within a 
common conversation about the importance of saving lives in the name of an ever-shifting 
notion of common humanity, that ultimately allows us to make judgements about what 
might constitute a humanitarian act of rescue. 
Section V. addresses head-on the multi-layered potential for rescue to cause harm 
that emerges throughout the article, and which arises from the inherently presumptive 
native of humanitarian action in contexts of power disparity. As the first two sections 
revealed, harm and violence can come from treating the other merely as body, and not as 
complete human; it can come from imposing one’s notion of humanity upon the other, a 
particular peril because it is often precisely one’s conception of humanity that pushes one 
to act, to save the other but also oneself. Finally, the perceived need to employ violence 
towards humanitarian ends admits no easy answers, for the definition of those ends takes 
place within, and not outside of, the humanitarian conversation. Hands are unlikely to 
remain clean. Humanitarians need to embrace the politics of their endeavour and present 
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themselves as what Michael Walzer calls ‘moral politicians’, able to learn from spontaneous 
humanitarians not just their commitment to saving lives, but also their humility.  
  
II. RESCUING BODIES OR SAVING LIVES? THE MEANINGS OF RESCUE 
 
This section considers different ways of thinking about the meaning of rescue, from thin 
accounts of saving human bodies to much thicker ones of saving human lives. It argues that 
there is no neutral, objective way of doing so. All rely on necessarily provisional accounts of 
what humanity is, embody specific relations of power, and raise particular challenges for 
humanitarian practice. The challenges of rescue cannot be understood without grasping the 
contingent, dynamic character of the conceptions of common humanity that inspire it, And, 
in particular, how this might be shaped or distorted by putative rescuers. 
Sometimes, the meaning of rescue, and its place within our understanding of 
humanitarianism, can appear clear. On the one hand, in a warzone a doctor can stem the 
flow of blood resulting from a potentially fatal gunshot wound, or at a feeding station during 
a famine a child can be brought back from the brink of starvation. On the other hand, we 
are often faced, as with the haunting picture of Alan Kurdi, with evidence of a life that could 
all-too-easily have been saved, but was not.
11
 
                                                          
11
 Cases such as Kurdi’s should, I think, make us slightly queasy at the somewhat mechanistic, abstracted way 
in which the “Shallow Pond theorists”, to borrow Kwame Anthony Appiah’s phrase, draw on archetypes of 
drowned children or other stylised examples of suffering to make their points. A famous example is of course 
Peter Singer’s classic ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’.  Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a 
World of Strangers (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 173; Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:3 (1972). On the danger of omitting nuance from moral reasoning, see 
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Behind those individual stories lie multi-faceted structural problems. Wider 
injustices or intractable conflicts underpin the threat to life, or indeed the fact that rescue is 
an option for some but not others. Kurdi’s life could have been saved not only by rescue-at-
sea. While it would probably be too much to ask, both conceptually and practically, of 
humanitarianism that it resolve the crisis that led to his fatal journey, perhaps the stroke of 
a pen could have allowed his journey to take place safely strapped into an economy seat on 
a plane bound for Europe.
12
 
For particular people, on a particular day, the meaning of rescue can become 
narrow, clear and visceral: live or die; survive or perish. Though a conception of 
humanitarian crisis as merely a certain quantity of bodies on the brink of death can never 
sufficiently describe what is at stake in the conduct of humanitarian politics, some notion of 
humanitarian crisis as a threat to bodily survival remains an important practical basis for 
conceptualising humanitarian action. It follows that we should take seriously the idea that 
the heart of humanitarian action lies in the saving of human bodies. 
 This characterisation of the object of humanitarian rescue presents some obvious 
advantages. We know roughly how many calories a human body needs to survive another 
day, how much blood a body can lose before it expires, what medicine might cure or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Chris Brown, ‘Poverty Alleviation, Global Justice, and the Real World’, Ethics & International Affairs 31:3 
(2017). The bigger problem, which admittedly I may be reproducing here in referring to Kurdi, is powerfully set 
out in Sherene H. Razack, ‘Stealing the Pain of Others: Reflections on Canadian Humanitarian Responses’, 
Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 29:4 (2007). 
12
 On the humanitarian-security nexus on Europe’s border, and how the functions of saving and policing, 
rescuing and catching often intermingle, see Ruben Andersson, ‘Migration’, in Tim Allen, Anna Macdonald, and 
Henry Radice (eds.), Humanitarianism: A Dictionary of Concepts (London: Routledge, 2018). On calls for safe 
passage to Europe, see Joanne Liu, ‘EU: Your Fences Kill. Provide Safe and Legal Passage.’, msf.org (2015). 
10 
 
manage a fatal disease. This leads to conceptions of life-saving as that which, very simply, 
keeps human bodies alive, to be assessed and responded through scientific and technical 
expertise. The path to matching a person in need with a person in a position to help them is 
by no means simple. But prior to this problem is a bigger risk to conceptualising 
humanitarian action solely in terms of bodily life-saving. 
 The issue is the way that the terms of rescue can come to determine an individual’s 
humanity, imposing a definition of their identity so narrow it becomes a straightjacket. If, to 
save a human being it becomes sufficient to save a human body, that risks reducing the 
humanity of the rescued to a set of biological properties, to a kind of ‘bare life’.
13
 
Admittedly, sometimes one gets the impression that for Giorgio Agamben and his many 
followers within critical humanitarian studies, this leads to the extreme position that there 
is little more to humanitarian rescue than biopolitics, and that a refugee camp cannot in any 
meaningful way be distinguished from a concentration camp. They are both “sites of 
hierarchical power”, in Norman Geras’s phrase, and such sites are, for those of a biopolitical 
bent, the key loci of modernity and of modern social life.
14
 Against this, we might recall 
Primo Levi’s admonition against this kind of undiscriminating conflation: “There’s no gas 
                                                          
13
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). See also Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency 
(London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 36-41 and 84-85. 
14
 Geras is not referring specifically to Agamben. But Geras’ phrase and Levi’s riposte capture the issues 
perfectly. Norman Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference: Political Philosophy after the Holocaust 
(London: Verso, 1998), p. 100. 
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chamber at Fiat”.
15
 That is, all sites of hierarchical power do not necessarily imply a slippery 
slope towards extreme abuse. 
 Nevertheless, two important points emerge from this. The first is that it reminds us 
that the moment of rescue is necessarily one of radical power inequality between rescuer 
and rescued.
16
 At best this can strain the ability of each to identify with the other.
17
 At worst 
this can indeed lead to us rescuing for the other a very different idea of common humanity 
from that which we claim for ourselves. But in many respects, the play of this power 
disparity is much more nuanced. I shall return to this dimension of the problem in 
subsequent sections. The second point is that human bodies can never be sufficient 
descriptions of human beings, at least within the context of humanitarianism, wherein 
common humanity necessarily asserts itself as weightier than mere common biology. 
 This is the crux of the matter when it comes to understanding what humanitarianism 
is rescuing, the sense that a human being is not just a human body and that we cannot 
derive a satisfactory account of humanitarian action purely from bodily need. Is the rescue 
of human bodies a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rescue of a human being? 
Certainly, the claims of a humanitarian perspective that consistently ignored present bodily 
suffering would very soon ring hollow. But acts of memorialisation of dead individuals or 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Mary B. Anderson, ‘Aid: A Mixed Blessing’, Development in Practice 10:3 (2000).  
17
 ‘”You Save My Life Today, but for What Tomorrow?” Some Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid’, in Jonathan 
Moore (ed.), Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1998), p. 151. 
12 
 
lost communities can plausibly be understood as humanitarian acts.
18
 They address 
injustices committed by those who would erase people from history, and construct 
narratives that aim to prevent future injustices. The enormous body of Holocaust literature 
does this in several ways: it recovers some of the detail and complexity of the human lives 
that were annihilated, and reminds us of those acts of courage in the face of inhumanity 
that led to acts of rescue, or of attempted rescue. The wishful, indignant call of ‘never again’ 
is, among other things, an instance of humanitarianism using the process of memorialisation 
of those rescued and unrescued to obviate the need for future rescue. While it may seem 
that this idea of memorialisation as rescue is a story about prevention, about rescue-in-
advance, there is also perhaps a sense that it is also a last-ditch act of rescue which aims to 
save something of the humanity of those who were not rescued in the bodily sense.
19
 
 Dwelling on the intangible meanings of rescue takes us close to religious discourses 
of salvation (see Section III.). But this intangible sense of rescue also speaks to the more 
practical notion of témoignage, situating testimony squarely in the present, central to much 
of the French humanitarian tradition, and especially important to MSF.
20
 For José Antonio 
Bastos: “[even] if it is impossible to help the refugees, we must keep trying, and find the 
truth of what is happening, and we must speak. Sometimes speaking is the only action that 
                                                          
18
 Thomas W. Laqueur, ‘Mourning, Pity, and the Work of Narrative in the Making of "Humanity"’, in Richard 
Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown (eds.), Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
19
 On memory and humanitarianism: Rachel Ibreck, ‘Memory’, in Tim Allen, Anna Macdonald, and Henry 
Radice (eds.), Humanitarianism: A Dictionary of Concepts (London: Routledge, 2018). 
20
 On MSF and témoignage see D. Robert DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism: NGOs and the Crafting of 
Community (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), pp. 82-90. 
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is possible. To not speak is to fail the possibility of humanity.”
21
 The implication is simply 
that, at times, if we cannot rescue the individual lives under threat, we can at least save a 
“possibility of humanity”. 
 Even in the case of a single individual, at a single moment in time, humanitarian 
action as rescue potentially has to negotiate - and this negotiation is profoundly political 
and characterised by particular relations of power - conceptions of humanity across a wide 
range of contexts, which include humanity as a set of biological properties and humanity as 
ethical, political and legal identities. For some, these include less tangible notions of a soul 
or of unity with a divine being. For others, they might include the ability to care, love, laugh 
and cry. 
 Humanity can be understood, violated and rescued across all these dimensions. The 
complexity of that which is to be rescued and preserved is inextricably interwoven with the 
complexity of how we articulate the distinctiveness, value and beauty of humanity. 
Attempts to pin it down once and for all fail, as a lepidopterist’s display case must always 
fail to reveal the most vital characteristic of the butterfly: its mesmeric flight. Among 
influential recent attempts to grapple with this complexity, Martha Nussbaum’s list of the 
central human capabilities is a thoughtful and rich questioning of what constitutes a human 
life, of what people should be able to do and be to live a life that might be considered fully 
                                                          
21
 My italics. Cited in James Orbinski, An Imperfect Offering: Dispatches from the Medical Frontline (London: 
Rider, 2009), p. 290. 
14 
 
human, including, for instance the ability to have an emotional and imaginative life.
22
 But 
ultimately, as an answer, it proves unsatisfactory, precisely because it takes the form of a 
list, and such a document is always likely to be more plausible as a political programme to 
enable more humane lives than as a description of humanity itself. 
 A list cannot quite ever succeed in capturing the boundless and unpredictable 
creativity of a Mozart or a Shakespeare. Nussbaum may come closer than most, by trying to 
capture the potentialities of human life, and taking seriously the things, like love, that really 
give it meaning.
23
 She makes a good case for a human life conceived of according to the 
central capabilities as being much less nasty, brutish and short than any number of 
alternatives. But the intangible, by definition, still eludes such an exercise. We are unlikely 
to place such a list in our time capsules, for to do justice to its ambitions is to acknowledge 
its inevitable provisionality. This provisionality is something that Anne Phillips’s The Politics 
of the Human captures well, its anti-foundationalism drawing on the “contrast Sartre makes 
between saving someone as abstract man (or human) while annihilating him in his 
specificity and particularity”.
24
 
 Thus the dilemma that, when it comes to potential acts of rescue, there may be 
profound tensions in terms of which elements of a perceived common humanity may be 
                                                          
22
 The list is evolving, but a good account can be found in Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 70-86. Her list 
consists of: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; 
affiliation; relationship with other species; play; control over one’s political and material environment. 
23
 See also Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (London: Belknap Press, 2013). 
24
 Anne Phillips, The Politics of the Human (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 18. 
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rescued. Some elements may be saved, others sacrificed, with all the violence that implies.
25
 
In contexts of forced migration, for instance, there are real dilemmas about whether the 
humanitarian act is to try to save the most bodies or to try to save the context and way of 
life within which people conceptualised their own humanity. One may well involve 
sacrificing the other.
26
 This dilemma can permeate an individual’s experience of rescue. 
Caroline Moorehead’s Human Cargo demonstrates that many refugees who are relocated 
and attain bodily security, who are rescued in quite a concrete way by institutionalised 
humanitarianism, nevertheless often experience a numbing, irreplaceable loss of all the 
other elements, beyond their own immediate bodily security, that add up to a human life 
beyond the mere passing of days.
27
 
 This tension is of course primarily experienced by the rescued. But it also 
characterises some of the sharpest dilemmas of humanitarian action by potential rescuers. 
Naturally, other considerations beyond the rescue of those in danger, such as political 
expediency, often condition the actions of potential humanitarian actors. But there are also 
dilemmas about whether, say, in effect to collaborate in forced displacement, in order to 
save people in the short term. Variations of this kind of dilemma have been experienced 
widely within the ‘humanitarian international’, for instance in the creation of ‘safe’ areas in 
Bosnia in the early 1990s, in the delivery of aid in refugee camps in (then) Zaire in 1994-
                                                          
25
 On sacrifice and triage, see Peter Redfield, ‘Sacrifice, Triage, and Global Humanitarianism’, in Michael 
Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2008). 
26
 On how humanitarianism can aggravate the issues by dehistoricising and depoliticising refugees, see Liisa H. 
Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization’, Cultural Anthropology 11:3 
(1996). 
27
 Caroline Moorehead, Human Cargo: A Journey among Refugees (London: Vintage, 2006). 
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1996, or in the violation of the principle of non-refoulement in disbanding those camps.
28
 Of 
course, in facing these dilemmas, humanitarian actors are necessarily imposing their own 
conceptualisations of rescue, and what it means to be rescued. 
It is clearly hard to gain a clear picture of what saving a human being, beyond saving 
a human body, entails. Bodily survival is vital, but is never likely to be sufficient to make 
sense of the negotiation of what a common humanity might be or entail. The dilemmas 
evoked above, wherein humanitarian actors have to choose between which kind of act of 
rescue will better honour their conception of a common humanity, also make clear the fact 
that, ultimately, it is their conception of that common humanity which will inform the 
decision taken. It is therefore their conception that will be saved or lost, along with the 
human lives at stake. Rescue ‘in the name of humanity’ usually means rescue in the name of 
a very particular understanding of humanity. Saving a body carries the risk of diminishing 
the human life it embodies, while trying to save a thicker notion of human life risks imposing 
another, rather different notion of human life. 
 
III. THE ROLE OF THE RESCUER 
The previous section brought to the fore the subjectivity of the rescuer, and so it is to that 
role we now turn. What functions does the role of rescuer serve for those who embrace it? 
This section explores the role and the position of the rescuer, alive to the central problem 
that, in articulating a conception of wounded common humanity in response to the 
                                                          
28
 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (London: Cornell University Press, 
2002); Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World (London: Penguin, 2008). 
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suffering of another, the concerned agent risks defining the other’s humanity for her, albeit 
perhaps for the very ‘best’ of motives. 
The ethical stakes are raised when it comes to engaging in potential acts of rescue, 
for the moment of rescue is, almost by definition, one in which one agent hold’s the other’s 
life in her hands. How she understands and characterises the other’s humanity is in her 
hands as well. While she may want to deny this power, she must also will it. This is well 
illustrated by Roger Rosenblatt: 
  
If you really knew what drives me - and I imagine drives most of my colleagues when 
we go to places where people are suffering things that no people ought to suffer - it 
is the impulse to rescue. The impossible, illogical, entirely emotional, impractical, 
impolitic impulse to take those children in my arms - and adults in my arms - and 
save them. If you have ever watched a man or a woman or a child die from 
starvation, you know the powerlessness of mortality, and you so want to be a god at 
that moment and to be able to breathe life into a fellow creature.
29
 
 
This states very clearly something that is arguably a necessary correlate of the desire to 
engage in humanitarian action and save human lives: the desire to play God (and the 
relationship between a God and its creation cannot be one of equals). 
 Though merely a figure of speech for Rosenblatt, the character of a quasi-religious, 
or indeed avowedly religious mission is writ large across the history of humanitarianism. 
This speaks to an irony of modern humanitarianism. It was enabled by the opening up of a 
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particular intellectual space by humanist and then Enlightenment thinking, largely against 
the strictures of religious dogma. However, as humanitarianism emerged as a framing for 
practical action, much of the motivation of those who engaged in humanitarian action 
remained deeply religious, linked to powerful ethical codes such as Christian charity. 
 This was clearly the case during the one of the first modern international 
humanitarian campaigns, to abolish the Atlantic slave trade.
30
 The campaign was 
characterised by discourses of humanity and freedom, visceral reactions to revelations 
about the cruelty of the practices involved, and strong conceptions of religious mission. For 
some abolitionists, what they aimed to save might have been simply the tortured bodies of 
the slaves, to be released from bondage to engage in, develop, or rediscover their own 
projects. For others, the object of rescue was the freedom of the Enlightenment’s universal, 
perfectible man. For many, the key objects of salvation were people’s souls. The slaves were 
to be freed not to become fully human on their own terms, but rather to become fully 
human in the only acceptable way, as Christians to be saved, if not in this life then in the 
next. Important to many abolitionists, perhaps the dominant concern, was the salvation of 
their own souls, the preservation of which became, in their eyes, incompatible with the 
owning of slaves.  
 A militant religious drive for salvation was a major factor in the development of 
institutionalised humanitarianism in the nineteenth century, imbricated with other 
salvationist (and colonial) projects, such as the floods of missionaries spreading out across 
the world, or, at the domestic level, the creation of organisations like the Salvation Army. 
The humanitarianism of, say, Gladstone encompassed campaigns to save far-flung 
                                                          
30
 See for instance Adam Hochschild, Bury the Chains: The British Struggle to Abolish Slavery (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2005). 
19 
 
Christians, notably in Bulgaria, and nocturnal missions to ‘rescue’ ‘fallen women’.
31
 In the 
same era, the campaigning journalist W.T. Stead linked his sensational reports on atrocities 
in Bulgaria to his own spiritual self-preservation and avoidance of damnation.
32
 A happily 
‘fallen’ nineteenth century humanitarian, Byron, mocked the naïve tendency of his 
contemporaries in the London Greek Committee to conceive their putative objects of rescue 
in a manner equally detached from the lived experience of the actual people at stake.
33
 
Philhellenes obsessed with ancient Greece were no doubt dismayed to find an absence of 
philosophising Classical Greeks to save when they arrived on the shores of a contemporary 
Greece heavily under Ottoman influence. To take another different conception of what is 
being saved, Andrew Carnegie’s “scientific philanthropy” embodied a vision of the human 
perfectible through the application of modern scientific knowledge.
34
 
Underpinning the humanitarianism of Gladstone, Byron or Carnegie is the ease with 
which humanitarianism can become associated with utopian projects and the projection of 
an idealised humanity. The persistence of this tendency is powerfully critiqued by David 
Rieff, who sees contemporary humanitarianism as taking on the role of “saving idea”, 
“central to the Western imagination” because of its persistence as the last “moral fable” left 
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standing.
35
 As such, the idea of rescue underpins what Craig Calhoun calls the ‘emergency 
imaginary’.
36
 Indeed, I would argue that humanitarian action always depends on a ‘rescue 
imaginary’ through which we construct the terms of the humanitarian social encounter. And 
close to the concept of the imaginary lurk the notions of fantasy and delusion - we are still 
very clearly failing sufficiently to challenge and reduce the role of ‘white saviour complex’ 
within humanitarian action. 
The challenge is to prick the bubbles of delusion without engendering hopelessness. 
For Rieff, “humanitarianism is a hope for a disenchanted time. If it claims to redeem, it does 
so largely in the limited sense that in a world so disfigured by cruelty and want it intervenes 
to save a small proportion of those at risk of dying, and to give temporary shelter to a few of 
the many who so desperately need it.”
37
 Rieff defends the minimal, visceral act of providing 
“a bed for the night” - a minimal, partial act of rescue. But he is sceptical about the way it 
also nourishes that “longing for salvation [which] is all but hardwired into Western culture”. 
When it comes to the bigger picture, it “is a saving idea that, in the end, cannot save but can 
only alleviate”.
38
 
 But Stephen Hopgood’s work suggests that this humble approach may not be 
sufficient for many of those engaging in humanitarian action, for they crave a justificatory 
framework within which to define their moral authority, even when they are not concerned 
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with saving souls, but merely bodies.
39
 Laura Hammond also notes the tendency of 
professional humanitarians to elevate their principles “to the level of the secular-sacred”.
40
 
For religious strands of humanitarianism, the framework is clear, as is the redemptive power 
of acts of rescue. But returning to Rosenblatt’s quote, even the most avowed atheist, 
confronted with an expiring child, will either yearn for a God-like power to rekindle life, or a 
God-like, transcendental authority to denounce that suffering as wrong and unjustifiable. 
Even if the conception of the human invoked is not a religious one, it goes significantly 
beyond mere embodiment. While the chosen, practical act of rescue may well be limited to 
an act of bodily life-saving, with the attendant risks of negotiating with the other only on the 
basis of ‘bare life’, the context of that act of rescue can never be limited to the practical act, 
for it is always embedded in a struggle to articulate and preserve a thicker, more intangible 
sense of common humanity, albeit one that may be narcissistic and contain its own sources 
of violence and suffering. 
 However, there remains “a possibility of humanity” connected to that visceral 
experience of a human life in danger, and therefore a possibility of rescue if the more 
intangible meanings of humanity at play for the rescuer is in synch with the requirements of 
the situation. Moreover, does it matter if I think you’re saving my body, while you think 
you’re saving your and/or my soul? This leads to the question of how to weigh motives, 
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intentions and consequences, and the broader location of humanitarian rescue within 
international ethics. 
Before delving deeper into that discussion, I will consider the voices of the 
Righteous. According to the testimony of Rescuers, the category of common humanity was 
particularly psychologically salient for them. But in engaging in reactions of rescue, the 
visceral played a part, and also threatened the integrity of the Rescuers’ identity, sense of 
self and humanity. For Otto, “the primitive had certainly a strong part in my motives.” He 
also evoked a fellow rescuer, “a woman who said she was tired of hearing about her spirit, 
courage, and nobility. ‘I did it because of self-respect,’ she said, ‘a lot of self-respect.’” For 
Otto: “I like the word self-respect because it is what I said before. It is one of the egotistic 
components in my motivation. I respect more and feel good about it and this is a very good 
definition."
41
 
 This suggests that humanitarian rescue is always both about saving the other and 
saving one’s sense of self. It is both other-regarding and narcissistic, and the two elements 
are not really separable. The problem here, of course, is that the risks of failure are not 
necessarily equivalent. For the rescuer, the risk may be a loss of self-esteem, for the other, 
death, another facet of the inherent inequality of rescue. This pushes us to explore further 
how we might plausibly characterise rescue meaningfully, and to ask whether there is any 
stable basis to assess an act of rescue and say that it is consistent with an account of 
humanitarianism. 
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IV. DO MOTIVES MATTER? 
 
So far, this article has delineated the idea of rescue within humanitarian action as 
something that oscillates between self and other, that is always infused with power 
relations, and which involves a constant (political) negotiation of what humanity means and 
entails. Given how central the promise of rescue is to the ethical status of humanitarianism, 
understanding the ethics of rescue is thus crucial. On what basis, if any, can we make 
qualitative assessments of acts of rescue, in a manner that can honour the meaning(s) of 
rescue for both rescued and rescuer? This section draws on discussions within international 
political theory to elucidate this question, in particular the interplay between motives, 
intentions and consequences in framing our judgements about putative acts of 
humanitarian rescue. 
Yad Vashem accords the title of ‘Righteous among the Nations’ according to both the 
acts themselves and the motives behind them.
42
 The question of motive is a key touchstone 
in humanitarian debates. For many, the absence of a motive entirely consistent with the act 
of rescue calls into question the validity of that act, whatever the outcome. In fact, three 
distinct variables are worth considering here: motives, intentions and consequences. The 
tensions between them have been usefully explored within international political theory in 
relation to military humanitarian intervention. For Terry Nardin, an “agent’s intention is 
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what he chooses to do; his motive is the dispositions and desires that explain his choice”.
43
 
Motive relates to our reason for action, intention to how we plan to act. Nardin also notes 
that motive and intention are often used interchangeably. When it comes to the carrying 
out of the act itself, another element comes into play: the means of rescue, which will be 
examined in Section V. For now, we will concentrate on the interplay between motives, 
intentions and consequences, arguing that, for different reasons, all are important, but that 
they function at different levels of the humanitarian endeavour. 
 In a characteristically provocative piece, Stephen Hopgood asks whether, if the core 
justification of the practice of humanitarianism is to save lives, a consequentialist logic 
ultimately imposes itself upon the process of deciding how those lives should be saved.
44
 If 
it can be done best by a profit-seeking company, then why not? After all, is humanitarianism 
not always motivated by a variety of different justifications? The piece provokes partly 
because in raising the question of money and profit, it touches upon an issue with which 
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many professional humanitarians are profoundly uncomfortable. The Red Cross principle of 
voluntariness is rarely mentioned in analytical work, because it is generally not seen to carry 
as much weight as ideas such as impartiality or neutrality. But arguably it still goes deep into 
professional humanitarians’ sense of self, and suggests that for many, doing the right thing 
for the right reasons remains crucial (even if they are uncertain as to what the right thing 
might be). 
 This fits into Hopgood’s analysis of humanitarianism’s oscillation between sacred 
and profane.
45
 To focus only on effectiveness risks forfeiting a sense of transcendental 
moral authority. Yet the “keepers of the flame”, in becoming gatekeepers of their practice, 
risk dwindling impact on the real world. Fine motives, or plausible declared intentions alone 
can never be enough if they do not lead to meaningful outcomes. For James Orbinski, “[the] 
moral intention of the humanitarian act must be confronted with its actual result”.
46
 
Hopgood’s argument challenges us to ask whether there is any better way of defining 
humanitarianism than the vague, but visceral, notion of the existential act of saving a life. 
His conclusions come close to Rieff’s: humanitarianism should scale down its ambition and 
stick to saving some lives and providing some beds for the night. 
 On its own terms, Hopgood’s line of argument is difficult to rebut. One possibility, 
from within the practice, is suggested by Rony Brauman, MSF’s preeminent éminence grise. 
We might accept the consequentialist logic of varying sources of life-saving relief, such as 
armies or corporations. But that does not necessarily mean we have to label the action 
humanitarian and to locate it within humanitarianism. It can be valuable on moral grounds 
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other than those described as humanitarian.
47
 Brauman’s point is logical in terms of 
defending the operational principles needed to run a consistent humanitarian practice. But 
ultimately, the distinction cannot hold if we see humanitarianism as a wider context for the 
negotiation of common humanity and human solidarity. In this negotiation, surely what is 
crucial is not what professional dedicated humanitarians are willing to do, but precisely 
what those who are not might be. Humanitarianism is as much about expanding the latter 
as the former. 
At best, this is about bringing into the conversation actors, like those carrying out 
acts of rescue during the Holocaust, who are not conventional humanitarian actors but 
whose acts get to the heart of what we mean by the term humanitarian. At worst, it is about 
limiting the excesses of actors with very different agendas. Humanitarianism teases out the 
minimal, not just maximal, understandings of our common humanity and what is required 
to preserve or save it. For instance, part of the role of international humanitarian law is to 
define what one should accord one’s enemies out of common humanity. Brauman and 
Hopgood both share a consequentialist vision of life-saving action, they merely differ on the 
significance and placement of the boundaries of ‘humanitarian’ action within that. 
 A consequentialist approach to saving lives can coexist perfectly well with a concern 
to take intentions seriously, as long as the intentions correspond to the articulation of 
outcomes, and are not simply collapsed with a deontological account of a “correct” 
humanitarian motive. In the context of humanitarianism, it is especially important to make a 
clear distinction between motive and intention, for humanitarianism is a context in which 
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different motives can coalesce into a shared intention to act in pursuit of a certain kind of 
outcome. As Nick Wheeler puts it: “the key question is not the purity of motives but the 
relationship between motives and humanitarian outcomes.”
48
 The common phrase ‘good 
intention’ is problematic because it often means ‘correctly-motivated intention’. The idea of 
a single legitimate humanitarian motive for rescue is a category error, which reduces 
‘humanitarian’ to a synonym of ‘altruistic’. We can have mixed, diverging motives, but share 
the determination and declared intention to engage in an act of rescue linked to ideas about 
the importance of common humanity. One might be interested in the preservation of an 
immortal soul, the other in a sense of consistency with a political ideology in which the care 
for others is important, the third feel the need to expunge a previous act of cruelty. It makes 
more sense to discuss the role of motives within humanitarianism, rather than humanitarian 
motives as such. It is the political negotiation of different motives that leads to intentions. 
 At a different level of analysis, motives present the biggest qualification to a purely 
consequentialist account of acts of rescue within humanitarianism. Within humanitarian 
practice, a consequentialist logic is ultimately irresistible if the goal of the practice is to 
maximise life-saving action. But the previous two sections, in discussing the complexities of 
articulating the meaning of saving a human life, suggest that, if the idea of saving lives is to 
be assigned value, we have to engage with the ways in which such value is generated. The 
goal of the practice, even narrowed down to the saving of human lives, is deeply complex in 
its possible meanings. The goal of saving human lives exists in a wider social context, one in 
which the goal is articulated and defined as valuable. The goal is such a fragile one, its 
betrayals so frequent, that it becomes vitally important to understand how it can come to 
be valuable and spur people to action. So we have to turn back to the reasons why people 
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save other people, and take motives seriously in a more general sense. It is not a question of 
finding some pure humanitarian motive, but rather of drawing together the threads of why 
a sense of solidarity can emerge sufficient to call for and generate acts of rescue, that is, to 
coalesce into concrete intentions.  
 Returning to the Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust: if a sense of common 
humanity makes it important and desirable that Jews be rescued, the rescue of Jews can 
plausibly become a humanitarian campaign within which not every individual act has to be 
linked back to a pure ‘humanitarian motive’. To do so would be unnecessarily demanding, 
untestable and a misunderstanding of the breadth and complexity of humanitarianism as a 
category. Yet, to understand the development of the view that it is desirable that Jews, or 
others, be rescued under the auspices of a common humanity, it also seems valuable and 
important to look at the particular reasons given by those who did exactly that. 
 When those reasons are examined, they reveal that a search for purity would be 
fruitless. For Otto: “I also examined myself whether it wasn't part of showing off, and it 
was”.
49
 When asked, “did you see your activities with the Resistance as being primarily 
political or primarily as a result of your humanitarian instincts?”, he responded “Both. Both. 
Both."
50
 For Knud, ‘humanitarian’ motivations were inextricably mixed with a strong desire 
to resist German aggression at all costs, and the desire to protect Jews as fellow Danes.
51
 
What is interesting is precisely that the rescuers were very different, ‘ordinary’ people (or at 
least people who saw themselves and their actions as ordinary) who engaged in exceptional 
activity according to a similar pattern. Very different lives and experiences fed into common 
                                                          
49
 Monroe, The Hand of Compassion, p. 91. 
50
 Ibid., p. 95. 
51
 Ibid., p. 180. 
29 
 
ways of interpreting and acting on the situation they saw before them. Different and 
complex sets of life choices led to a moment in which they felt they had no choice but to 
act. Their perceptions of what was at stake were very similar: they all felt the salience of 
belonging to a common humanity, the resonance this had within their sense of identity, and 
that the integrity of their sense of self depended on the consistency of their actions with 
their self-understanding.
52
 So in understanding the rescue of Jews during the Holocaust, we 
can characterise rescue in a number of different ways, including the practical rescue of Jews 
(in which a consequentialist logic should be seen as important at an aggregate level, lest we 
return to the position that the only valid acts of rescue were ones done for impeccable 
reasons), the saving of the sense of self of those who felt compelled to rescue. Kristen 
Monroe also points to the acts of rescuers saving the very ‘possibility of humanity’ evoked 
above: 
 
Resistance to genocide is not just an affirmation of universalism in which every 
human being is entitled to rights and equal treatment by virtue of being born 
human. It is more than simply seeing the humanity in the Jews, more than seeing the 
bonds that connect us. It is also a cherishing, a celebration of all the differences - 
individual and group - that allow for human flourishing, set firmly within the context 
of universal worth. This is what the rescuers protected for all of us when they 
resisted genocide, prejudice, and ethnic violence. Their very ordinariness, their very 
humanness, encourages us to look deep within our own souls and ask if we, too, do 
not possess this possibility.
53
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Within the context of humanitarianism, then, rescue can plausibly entail a consequentialist 
logic once articulated, but we must look beyond that logic to understand the reasons behind 
its articulation. Humanitarian action can be invalidated both by a lack of tangible results, 
and by lack of justification for why those results might be valuable. It cannot, however be 
assessed at the level of intention, for that will yield an impoverished account explaining 
neither inputs to nor outcomes of the politics of humanity. 
 Furthermore, when we look at how motives and intentions intersect in 
contemporary professionalised humanitarian practice, where the identification with a 
common humanity is clearly articulated, we see that individual humanitarians inevitably 
have complex, idiosyncratic reasons for actually engaging in humanitarian action.
54
 
Humanitarian rescue depends on notions of common humanity being nested amongst, and 
intertwined with, (both individual and collective) actors’ other commitments and interests. 
It depends on actors’ self-understanding, indeed self-interest, incorporating a humanitarian 
component that might be activated due to an entirely different need or interest of the 
actor. In Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, motives come into play not in the guise of providing an 
illusory humanitarian purity but insofar as they are compatible with action promoting the 
emergence of norms legitimising humanitarian intervention.
55
 As academic debates on 
military humanitarian intervention morphed into ones on the Responsibility to Protect, Chris 
Brown made the important point that for it to succeed in its aims, it needed to shed its 
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antipolitics and its goals become embedded in the self-understandings and interests of key 
powerful actors.
56
 
But that inevitable privileging of the interests and preferences of powerful actors in 
acting in the name of humanity, needs to be tempered by the voices of whose who may 
plausibly call humanity by a different name. That is, claims of saved human lives need to be 
challenged by the reality of those lives before and after intervention, and considered in 
relation to what may have been lost or sacrificed along the way. Latent throughout the 
article so far has been the possibility of humanitarians, in their presumption, causing harm 
or violence, and the final section will address this problem head on. 
 
V. VIOLENCE, POWER AND POLITICS 
We had to burn the village in order to save it.
57
 
(American soldier in Vietnam) 
This notorious quote reminds us of the risks immanent in a heroic salvationism – the power 
to rescue is a power easily abused, and the potential of humanitarian action to cause harm 
is now widely recognised. Among others, Mary Anderson’s work noted the negative side-
effects that humanitarianism can have, such as the way aid can exacerbate conflict, or 
create dependency.
58
 She famously called for humanitarianism to strive to “do no harm”, an 
aspiration that remains influential today.
59
 But is this remotely possible? 
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It is vital, in a study of rescue in humanitarian action, to focus in on the problem of 
causing harm, which was a constant implicit tension in Sections II. and III. The problem 
emerges from the most paradoxical aspect of rescue, which is in turn perhaps the defining 
paradox of humanitarianism: humanitarians seek to act based on some notion of shared, 
equal humanity. Yet to act is to seek and claim power, to engender inequality.
60
 
The moment of rescue is necessarily a radically contingent and undetermined one, 
wherein different conceptions of the human are negotiated, but negotiated in a context of 
fundamental power disparity. This context of inequality, though, is necessary to the 
possibility of rescue, just as it is in many areas of our social life, such as fire-fighting or in an 
intensive care unit. We might well think that acts of rescue are valuable and tolerate, or 
even promote, such inequalities. But we must recognise the potential for harm inherent 
within them. The most obvious instance is where the potential rescued agent does not see 
themselves in need of rescue at all, and the act of rescue actually becomes the main, 
unwanted, driver of change in their life. 
 The possibility of missionary excesses can never be completely overcome, for the 
moment of rescue is one of life’s “presumptive occasions”, to borrow Michael Walzer’s 
phrase.
61
 Walzer uses the example of preventing a suicide, choosing to emphasise the 
overriding value of life, even though we cannot fully know how much worth that value 
retains for the attempted suicide. The question of how much we need to know about the 
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other in order to save them is crucial for humanitarianism.
62
 But perhaps humanitarianism 
can never know enough, constantly negotiating the earthly and the intangible. Therefore 
humanitarian action must always be seen as a presumptive occasion to some extent, with 
potential for immense rewards, but also immense harms. 
 But even in cases where a large part of the act of rescue is clearly agreed upon 
between rescuer and rescued, the act can still cause harm, for instance in limiting, or 
appearing to limit, the rescued’s humanity and possibilities to that particular relationship of 
bodily rescue. In many entrenched refugee situations the body is nourished but the 
humanity is left on life-support. The danger of this is particularly high in the kinds of 
contexts in which humanitarian acts of rescue are called for, precisely because they are 
contexts of radical and rapid change, in which a conception of restorative rescue, to a life 
similar to that which went before, may well be impossible.
63
 In that case, the rescuer faces 
choices about what new and different life they are enabling or imposing.  
 There is also the question of unintended side-effects. The provision of food aid is 
notoriously difficult precisely because of the distortions it can impose on local economies 
and livelihoods, and its ambiguous role in the political economy of conflict. Two decades 
ago, Alex de Waal, writing on famine, argued that “[the] greatest harm done by the 
humanitarian international is to create delusion”:  
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Western governments and donating publics are deluded into believing the fairy tale 
that their aid can solve profound political problems, when it cannot. The 
humanitarians deceive themselves about their own importance. Most significantly, 
local people (“recipients” or “beneficiaries”) are deluded into believing that salvation 
can come from other than their own actions. Some tangible material benefits (many 
fewer than are commonly believed) are delivered, but at the cost of sustaining this 
tremendous, institutionalized delusion. Meanwhile, the real reasons why people 
survive and conquer famine are obscured.
64
 
 
Professional humanitarianism has learned from such criticisms and developed much since 
then.
65
 But the deeper point, about people’s agency and role in their own survival still rings 
true when set against the imaginaries embodied by subsequent humanitarian projects such 
as the Responsibility to Protect.
66
 
For Rieff, “it is impossible to really do no harm”.
67
 This links to his sense that it is 
important to acknowledge that the context of humanitarianism is failure, and therefore 
thinking that we can step into such contexts and do no harm must always be entirely 
illusory.
68
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 Most controversial of all is the problem of violent means, arguably the crux of 
whether military humanitarian intervention can plausibly be situated within 
humanitarianism. The issue is not whether the ICRC should have a standing army. Rather, 
the question is whether professional humanitarian organisations’ many reasons for 
distancing themselves from the use of violence imply excluding the use of violence entirely 
from the wider discussion about humanitarian rescue. 
 Rieff argues that by allying itself to the use of force, humanitarianism risks 
undermining its ability to do any good. He criticises the obscuring of the reality of violence 
by defenders of humanitarian violence.
69
 Rieff is not a pacifist, and believes that force may 
be sometimes morally required, but he distinguishes the moral justification of the use of 
force from the practice of humanitarianism. As Orbinski puts it: “Humanitarian action exists 
only to preserve life, not to eliminate it”.
70
 The Talmudic saying that prefaced this article is 
preceded by the idea that whoever destroys a life, destroys an entire world.
71
 
 But surely Rieff’s intuition that force should be used to stop a genocide, and his 
notion that humanitarian violence is wrong stem from the same discussion - a humanitarian 
discussion about the universal value of human life and the need to defend a common 
humanity. Though ultimately coming down on the same side of the argument as Rieff, Hugo 
Slim notes that: 
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The paradox of humanitarian violence should be allowed to raise its head and not 
simply be shouted down by humanitarian purists and critics of neo-liberal 
hegemony, for it represents a serious moral problem. The fact that the best way to 
restrain extreme violence and to protect civilians might be to use violence itself is a 
moral paradox that needs careful attention, not simple slogans.
72
 
 
It is clearly inappropriate to envisage organisations like the ICRC and MSF using or 
advocating force. But that is not the same thing as saying that stopping a genocide with 
force is not part of the same humanitarian discussion. If humanitarianism is the 
conversation through which we describe and understand the worst excesses of cruelty and 
inhumanity, it cannot exclude a priori action that emerges precisely as a response. We 
should always be sceptical of justifications for the use of force. But can we really exclude 
force once and for all from our understanding of how humanitarianism functions? Is it not 
possible that violence may always be the worst way to honour our sense of humanity, but 
on very rare occasions the only way to save or preserve it? 
 Humanitarian identity should not become co-terminus with particular agents across 
all time and all actions engaged in by the relevant agent. That would be a very ahistorical 
reading of humanitarianism.
73
 Immaculate humanitarian identity is not necessary to engage 
in humanitarian rescue in the name of a common humanity. Arguably the tendency to think 
the contrary reflects a desire to preserve the moral authority and voice within international 
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politics of particular humanitarian actors. The impulse to rescue looms large in our 
understanding of what humanitarianism is. But it necessarily coexists with the desire to pre-
empt future occasions for suffering, to engage in rescue-in-advance through the elaboration 
of laws, institutions and practices. An obvious example here is the development of human 
rights. Perhaps when it came to designing a more just system that obviated the need to 
rescue at all, someone who had spent their life publicly arguing against prejudice on the 
basis of race or religion would be able to make a more coherent input. We may well require 
high priests of humanitarianism, to go back to Hopgood’s point about sacred and profane. 
We need not ask these high priests to get their hands dirty, but merely tolerate within the 
politics of humanitarianism, within the politics of humanity, some who accept that burden. 
 This potential burden is complicated in two ways. First, the agents involved in actual 
humanitarian action are more likely to be collective agents. But my argument, while 
positioning itself against a blanket exclusion of violence from humanitarian action, fails to 
account for an important dimension of the actual use of violence in humanitarian acts of 
rescue, since it almost always involves ‘collateral damage’. As Michael Doyle puts it: “the 
necessarily ‘dirty hands’ of violent means often become ‘dangerous hands’ in international 
interventions.”
74
 The presumption of the rescuer is scaled-up, and they are confronted with 
an irresolvable equation with rescued people on one side and victims of collateral damage 
on the other. So some of the violence involved will very likely represent a moral crime on 
the very terms of the humanitarian project at stake. In his seminal essay on dirty hands, 
Michael Walzer writes that in the case of a politician who carries out, or orders a moral 
crime to be carried out: 
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he [sic] committed a moral crime and he accepted a moral burden. Now he is a guilty 
man. His willingness to acknowledge and bear (and perhaps to repent and do 
penance for) his guilt is evidence, and it is the only evidence he can offer us, both 
that he is not too good for politics and that he is good enough. Here is the moral 
politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral man and 
nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, 
he would pretend that they were clean.
75
 
 
The figure of the moral politician is particularly interesting in the context of 
humanitarianism’s politics of humanity. It is this kind of actor which might be tentatively 
situated within humanitarianism (perhaps within a government or a military force) to 
engage in acts of rescue. The moral politician is different from the high priest within the 
politics of humanity, but they are both part of the same broad enterprise (an iterative and 
contingent humanitarian conversation). There are obvious problems here, such as the 
danger of state leaders co-opting humanitarians as a “force multiplier”.
76
 But this section 
aims merely to suggest that while they should always be approached gingerly, there is at 
least the possibility that violent means might occasionally be included within 
humanitarianism, broadly understood, to defend the idea of a common humanity and 
human life, as well as particular human bodies. 
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 The problem of humanitarian violence reminds us of the possibility of tragedy, in the 
genuine sense of the term, inherent in the humanitarian enterprise: professional 
humanitarians are frequently in positions where all the options at their disposal involve 
doing wrong in a morally important way.
77
 De Waal has argued that the tragedy of 
humanitarians is precisely that ultimately they are unable completely to escape the 
possibility of acting cruelly.
78
 That is, they cannot entirely avoid causing precisely the kind of 
suffering that spurred them to act in the first place. This makes a strong case for embracing 
the role of the ‘moral politician’, for as Rieff argues: “[the] virtue of the political is that the 
case for making the most tragic of all public decisions becomes controversial and a matter 
for public debate, rather than some kind of categorical moral imperative whose need to be 
undertaken is deemed to be self-evident.”
79
 The challenge for putative humanitarians then, 
is how to face up to their moral and political responsibility in such situations, for they are 
not easily avoided or pre-empted. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Humanitarianism cannot be reduced to the concept of rescue, but acts of humanitarian 
rescue undoubtedly represent the heartbeats of its politics. The moment of humanitarian 
rescue is one of the key ‘presumptive occasions’ of our moral lives. Humanitarians must 
presume much about those they aspire to rescue, not least the content of their humanity. 
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They must will the power to rescue, but acknowledge and manage the politics that 
accompanies that power. Part of this politics is the negotiation of what rescue means, and 
thus what saving a human life means, a task surely beyond the capacity of any humanitarian 
actor. Moreover, humanitarians, in attempting to save others, are often seeking to save 
themselves. 
 This article has elucidated and grappled with this puzzle. First, it established that 
whether rescuing a body or saving a life, humanitarians must acknowledge both the 
limitations and partiality of the conceptions of humanity that underpin their action, and 
their role, as powerful actors, in determining these. Some frameworks for thinking about 
common humanity may be more flexible and fluid than others, but all remain provisional, 
and contain the potential to impose oneself on the other, possibly to the latter’s detriment 
(all the more so if they are embedded within broader structures of power, as is the case 
with state-led military humanitarian intervention of the Responsibility to Protect). 
 The article then explored the function the role of rescuer plays for the self. It argued 
that salvationist narratives, whether sacred or secular, are hard to escape, and form an 
important part of our humanitarian imaginaries. As such, best to identify the ‘possibility of 
humanity’ amid our particularities, rather than seek a hegemonic universalism. 
 It is easier then to see how the inevitably mixed motives of any humanitarian actor 
might contribute to acts of rescue that are acknowledged as humanitarian by both rescuer, 
rescued and bystander alike: the conversation about what humanitarian rescue looks like is 
informed both by the humanitarian impulses of those who act, and by the broader 
negotiation of what our shared humanity entails. 
 The problem, though, is that the power of the former is often such that other voices 
are crowded out, hence the potential for harm to be caused through a narrow or 
41 
 
inappropriate vision of the human bodies and lives at stake. Furthermore, it is hard to define 
the use of violent means completely out of the humanitarian toolkit, making listening to 
voices that might contest its inappropriate usages all the more important. At the centre of 
this problem sits the humanitarian actor, no longer able spontaneously to act on impulse, 
but rather forced to pause and deliberate, to acknowledge the power wielded, and the 
necessity of embracing the role of the ‘moral politician’, alive both to the potential tragedy 
of the position, and to the humility needed to limit it by recognising, and seeking to save, 
something of the humanity of others. 
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